The Question of Obama's Iran Policy

So it's been about two months since the shit hit the fan in Iran and I was reflecting on the progress of the political turmoil there, and the context in which it is taking place both internally and internationally. I think we can all point to a number of developments that are fairly typical and unsurprising of the Iranian regime (indeed any totalitarian regime), while others that persist in offering people desirous of progressive change in the Islamic Republic a good deal of hope. First let's start with the unsurprising bit: the protests were quashed, the protesters arrested, tortured, and in a growing number of cases killed (both on the streets and in captivity). There has been mounting condemnation of the protesters and the violence with which they've greeted security forces and state-run institutions, and the reformist figures that are accused of fomenting unrest in the IR. The west (especially Britain), for its part, has been offered its own guilty verdict for stirring shit up via the many satellite channels funded by the US and, lest we forget, the embassies in Iran that are alleged to be mini-intelligence agencies.


On the other hand, we can by now conclude that the legitimacy of the Iranian state apparatus and the lone figure at its summit, Ali Khamenei, have been permanently stripped of their unquestioned authority. In just two months, the cleric whose words and actions were until recently treated with the medieval gravity of the divinely ordained, has been publicly accused of such everyday banalities as corruption, incompetence, , and human-rights abuses. The previously unheard cries of "marg bar diktator", itself an overnight occurence, quickly morphed into "marg bar khamenei" within a week of the first week of protests. Opposition figures refused to heed his warnings for weeks on end, despite the (understandable) timidity with which they did so. Only yesterday, a group of lawmakers formally approached the only body with the authority to impeach the Supreme Leader with a request to investigate him. To echo Reza Aslan, the word "Supreme" has been dropped from Khamenei's title.

This puts the Obama administration in an awkward position. Until the disputed election, Obama's Iran policy has been one of seeking talks with Khamenei's regime on the basis of mutual respect and interest. Despite Obama's intentions, the regime has repeatedly accused western nations of meddling in Iran's affairs, and this talking point has done nothing to further the goal of direct talks between the US and Iran. Obama has repeatedly stated that he expects Iran to reciprocate his administrations outreach within a year before other options are explored. It now appears probable that even (for the most part) turning a blind eye to the disputed election and the fierce crackdown on the opposition have not played out in favor of the United States. While there is no doubt the administration is closely examining developments in Iran,

This begs the question of what the United States ought to do in the absence of any hopes for talks. The Obama administration has been accused of not having an Iran policy, and while this may be an overstatement, I wonder if they have any sort of contingency plan besides "waiting this one out". On the one hand, Obama can not be seen as partial to the reformists if he is interested in pursuing talks, but on the other hand he has already called upon the Iranian regime to respect the will of the people, to allow them to demonstrate and express themselves peacefully, and Joe Biden has cast doubt on the results of the election.

Here are the alternatives:
a) Allow things to run their course in Iran throughout this protracted struggle, but conduct airstrikes against Iran's nuclear program. The airstrikes will almost certainly provide a catalyst for the arrest of more opposition figures and activists, and perhaps their execution.
b) Allow things to run their course in Iran and NOT attack their nuclear facility. This will eventually lead to a nuclear armed Iran that is likely to be more isolated internationally and more powerful regionally. Arab powers like Egypt and Saudi Arabia will almost certainly pursue their own nuclear ambitions, turning up the heat in regional politics.
c) Firmly side with the reformist camp, and refuse to conduct any military campaign against the Iranian regime. Further sanctions have proven time and again to only strengthen the power of the establishment, even though it has shown to slow down the progress of Iran's nuclear program. Opposition members will be at greater risk of prosecution for collaborating with imperialist forces. There is some speculation that an oil embargo would also only consolidate the regime's power.
d) Firmly side with reformists AND conduct airstrikes against Tehran's nuclear plants and key Revolutionary Guard targets. This would amount to a policy of regime change "enablement".

What are the other courses the United States could take?